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Cet article d’intérêt général porte sur la gestion des risques d'origine
technologique aux conséquences potentiellement catastrophiques. Il s’agit d’un
document de synthèse destiné à cerner les problèmes fondamentaux en matière de
gestion publique et privée des risques technologiques majeurs. Trois thèmes y
sont traités: l’évaluation, la distribution et le contrôle des risques. Les questions se
rapportant aux méthodes d’évaluation, à la perception des risques et aux
difficultés liées à l’établissement d’un seuil de tolérance sont d’abord passées en
revue. La seconde partie du document met en lumière les difficultés que présente
le partage optimal du risque entre les différents agents. La responsabilité civile de
la firme et de ses partenaires est alors examinée. Les problèmes liés à l’assurance
contre ce type de risque sont aussi brièvement décrits. Cet article traite enfin du
contrôle des risques en couvrant à la fois les approches préventives et les
stratégies d'atténuation des dommages. On y aborde premièrement les instruments
de contrôle dont dispose l’État pour réduire les risques. Du côté des firmes, les
sujets tels que l'investissement en sécurité, l'erreur humaine, le design
organisationnel et la divulgation de l'information sont passés en revue.
L'aménagement du territoire et la gestion des urgences sont ensuite abordés de
façon succincte dans la dernière partie de l'article.
This article is concerned with the management of major hazards stemming
from technology and entailing potentially dreadful consequences. It proposes a
brief  survey of the main difficulties and policy issues arising both in public and
private decision making when dealing with major technological risks. Three
themes are considered: risk assessment, risk sharing and risk control. Issues
related to evaluation methods, to risk perception and to the acceptable level of
risk are first examined. The article then goes on to explore the problem of optimal
risk sharing between the different stakeholders. The firm’s liability and extended
liability to the firm’s partners are considered. Insurance issues are also discussed.
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‡  CIRANOLastly, the survey addresses the control of risks both from a prevention and from
a damage mitigation point of view. The various instruments available to the State
to reduce risks are reviewed and several issues are also raised with respect to the
measures firms can take to reduce risks. Investment in safety, human error,
organisational design and information disclosure are addressed in this section.
The topics of siting and urban planning are analysed as mitigation strategies, and
the important aspect of emergency planning ends the survey.
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1. Introduction
In an era where technological progress is accelerating, one cannot avoid thinking about
the level of risk and uncertainty it entails. For technological progress is ambivalent. On
the one hand, it enhances economic growth and the quality of life; it shelters us vis-à-vis
natural forces, contributing to the prevention and reduction of latent disasters such as
epidemics; and it provides comforting replies to the advocates of pessimistic scenarios
based on limited natural resources. On the other hand, it exacerbates the consequences of
human error, and past experience also reveals that new industrial processes and products
often hide lethal side effects that show up only in the long run.
This chapter is concerned with the assessment, allocation and control of major
technological risks. Such risks refer to the probability of occurrence of dreadful outcomes
linked to an explosion, a fire, a leakage, or any sudden malfunctioning or misuse of
technology (as in Chernobyl, Seveso or Bhopal, for example), as well as to the eventual
outbreak of some general disease due to widespread exposure to hazardous industrial
substances (like silicone or asbestos, for example). They belong to the category of
catastrophic risks, which are characterized by small probabilities of large, collective and
irreversible losses [Chichilnisky and Heal (1992)]. They are also man-made and therefore
endogenous to human activity [see Smith (1996), chapter 13], unlike natural disasters
such as earthquakes or landslides. But they pertain to activities or decisions linked to the
production of goods, as opposed to other endogenous catastrophes such as bank runs,
financial collapse, war and riots.
Regulation and management practices towards major technological risks are now
evolving rapidly. The Environmental Protection Agency, for instance, has set new rules
for “risk management planning” only three years ago; these rules are currently being
implemented and refined in approximately 66,000 industrial facilities across the United
States. This chapter proposes a brief summary of the main difficulties and policy issues
which arise when dealing with major technological risks.
1 The presentation unfolds as
follows. The next section focuses on risk assessment; it includes topics such as the
public's perception of industrial risk and the definition of acceptance thresholds. Section 32
is devoted to risk sharing, or the ex ante allocation of liability for damages and financial
compensation should a disaster occur. In the fourth section, finally, we cover the subject
of risk control. This objective involves two complementary facets which are treated
successively: the first one - prevention - tackles what are a priori identified to be the
sources of risk, the second one - mitigation - aims instead at designing and implementing
contingency plans in order to reduce damages a posteriori. Section 5 contains concluding
remarks.
2. Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is the initial step before setting priorities and deciding on cost-effective
measures to control risks. To assess major technological risk one must evaluate its two
fundamental dimensions: (1) the magnitude of the potential adverse outcomes, and (2) the
probabilities attached to them. Risk assessment is not only limited to the analysis of a
single worst case scenario. It can provide a global picture and may therefore be presented
as a set of probability distributions over a full range of possibilities. The following is an
overview of the approaches involved in risk assessment.
2.1 Qualitative and quantitative assessment methods
Risk assessment is usually done in two steps. The first one aims at identifying the
sources of danger and at describing the extent of potential damages; it is essentially
qualitative. For risks associated to engineering system failures, the assessment can rely on
sophisticated identification methods such as HAZOP (Hazard and Operability studies) or
FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis).
2 They may use techniques like fault trees
and event trees to spell out the different scenarios. For example, one may want to examine
how a discharge of toxic and corrosive slurry into the atmosphere via the stack could
happen at a crystallization plant. A fault tree would then allow to discover, working
backwards, that the slurry might overflow into the pressure control valve header, that the
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 Comprehensive surveys are also available. See Lees (1996), or the recent book by Hélène Denis (1998)
and the references therein.
2 For a detailed description of the numerous risk identification and assessment methods, see Lees (1996),
volume 1.3
operator might fail to take action upon a rising-level signal and not reduce the input, and
that all this may have started with the level control valve on a discharge line being shut
inadvertently.
3 An event tree would consider the other side of the coin and exhibit the
possible consequences of a such an incident, each branch representing a particular
outcome.
Estimating the physical effects and extent of damages of a particular release
scenario involves the use of consequence or hazard models. Several systems have been
developed, many of them computerized, to assess resulting damages from specific
incidents such as spills, explosions, fires, toxic releases or other type of emissions. These
hazard model systems include the population vulnerability models, the SAFETI computer
code, the WHAZAN computer code, and the Yellow Book
4 models. All these make use of
dispersion models that trace out the impact zones.
The assessment of latent risks linked to health and environmental hazards focuses
on understanding the characteristics and effects on humans of hazardous substances.
Uncertainty lies mainly in the extent of damages a substance can cause given a certain
level of exposure to it. Evidence of carcinogenicity of dioxins, for instance, is obtained
from confronting animal bioassays to high doses and extrapolating from the findings to
the situation of humans who are exposed to much smaller doses. Extrapolation involves
making assumptions about the shape of the substance-disease relationship. Dose-response
models are then used to capture this relationship.
5 They generally give way to two distinct
approaches: one that seeks some exposure threshold below which no harmful effects can
be detected (the so-called NOAEL or no-observed-adverse-effect-level) and another that
develops a positive relationship over the whole range.
6 Together with other parameters
(nature, duration and spatial extent of exposure, size of the threatened population), this
information often leads to norm setting.
                                                          
3 This example is taken from Lees ( 1996), volume 1.
4 Methods for the calculation of the physical effects resulting from release of hazardous material, developed
in the Netherlands by the Committee for the Prevention of Disasters.
5 For a brief guide on health risk assessment methods, see the referenced document by the American
Chemical Society (1998).
6 For a more detailed analysis of the different dose-response models, their underlying assumptions and the
political implications for the regulatory process of toxic substances, see (Harrison and Hoberg, 1994).4
At the purely quantitative stage, probabilities are assigned to the different nodes in
the chain of events. Probabilities are also associated to the extent of resulting damages.
The difficulty is of course to associate probabilities to events for which data does not
exist. Hypothesis setting and expert judgement can here play a large role. An example of
a comprehensive risk assessment is provided by the Canvey reports. Public investigation
leading to this report was triggered by the proposal of United Refineries Ltd to construct
an additional refinery on Canvey Island in the UK. One objective was to investigate the
overall risks to health and safety arising from any interactions between existing and
proposed installations [Health and Safety Executive (1978), (1981)].
The assessment of major technological risk is rarely very precise, however.
Inaccuracies in the system’s description, lack of confidence in statistical data, the number
of judgmental hypothesis being made, the diversity of assessment methods, and the fact
that the scope of the analysis might have been limited a priori contribute altogether to set
a significant margin of error. Risk assessment results therefore usually include an estimate
of the uncertainty attached to them obtained from dispersion values or from sensitivity
analysis. This uncertainty can dictate priority setting. For example, one can decide to
focus on the better known risks in the name of efficiency and learning, or on the least
known risks instead, invoking the precautionary principle.
Another source of controversy in risk assessment is the approach taken to price
human and environmental casualties. There are a number of methods that intend to assign
a monetary value to risk reduction, as well as to life, health and the environment: hedonic
methods applied to the labor market (taking into account wage differentials, for instance),
cost-of-illness methods, and contingent methods directly asking the question to the
individuals.
7 The credibility of the figures obtained remains questionable, however, not
only for ethical reasons, but also because the occurrence of an industrial catastrophe is
likely to fuel public anger and to become a political event whose outcome is highly
unpredictable.
                                                          
7 For a detailed discussion of these methods, see chapters 2 and 3 of this book. See also, Landefeld and
Seskin (1982) on the economic value of life, Moatti (1989) on the willingness to pay for safety and Viscusi
(1993) on evaluation methods using labor market data.5
2.2  Risk perception
As mentioned above, the assessment of major technological risks is never exempt
from subjectivity. Individual risk perceptions remain an indispensable input, due to lack
of data concerning empirical frequencies, or because one usually needs to consider as well
the opinions and reactions of less informed stakeholders.
People’s biases when dealing with uncertainty are now well documented.
8 For
instance, some individuals directly relate the fact that an event or a chain of events seem
reasonable to the probability of it happening: the easier it is to visualize, the higher is the
assessed subjective probability of occurrence. The ease to identify the victims and the
attention given by the media to certain risks are also factors contributing to an
overestimation of the risks. This all relates to the so-called “availability heuristic”,
whereby an event will be judged probable or frequent to the extent that instances of it are
easily recalled or imagined. The degree of control one has over the risk is yet another
factor likely to affect risk perception. The more control there is, the more underestimated
is the actual risk. Moreover, risks assumed voluntarily are not perceived the same way as
those which are imposed. An agent willing to move near a toxic waste incinerator may not
perceive the risk the same way as one would if the owner of the incinerator chose to settle
and work in the neighborhood. Here, the perception of risk may also depend on the
existence of benefits associated to risk exposure (eg. lower real estate prices). The
presence of such benefits changes the point of reference from which people assess risks
and thus may in that way alter their evaluation or perception of the risk. Finally, some
people also tend to ignore probabilities that fall below some threshold, although the
opposite is also true: in certain occasions, people overvalue small probabilities in
proportion with the importance of potential damages and undervalue large probabilities.
All these drawbacks make the use of expected utility as a unifying model to encode,
aggregate and compare subjective perceptions quite problematic.
9
                                                          
8 For a survey of risk perception issues and the decision process for low probability events, see Camerer and
Kunreuther (1989). See also Slovic (1987) and Viscusi (1992) for models incorporating biases in risk
perception, Smith (1992) on the relationship between risk perception, information on risk and behavior
under uncertainty, and Lopes (1992) on misconceptions about the public’s ability to perceive risks
adequately.
9 For a survey on the topic of expected utility theory and alternative models of choice under uncertainty, see
Machina (1987).6
The various ways of framing and communicating risk also have an effect on
perception. Experimentation shows that different formulations of the same problem give
way to opposite attitudes in decision making. Choices framed in terms of number of lives
saved entail risk averse behavior or a preference for certainty versus randomness in
results; on the other hand, choices expressed in terms of number of lives lost give rise to
risk taking behavior or a preference for an uncertain loss over a certain one.
10 In this
context, risk communication often has two conflicting goals to meet at once: to warn the
people that some immediate actions on their part are required while at the same time
reassure them that the whole situation is kept under control. The communicator implicitly
seeks to inform the public about the so-called “objective” measure of risk and lead them
to update their beliefs.
11 Public trust in risk management institutions is then crucial, for it
does have a bearing on the way people perceive risks [Groothuis and Miller (1997)].
Risks are often perceived to be greater than they truly are when institutions are less
trustworthy.
2.3   The “acceptable” level of risk
Setting an acceptable or tolerable level of risk rarely comes through consensus. A
firm will decide upon the risks it considers tolerable based on its legal liability, its assets
and revenues, its technological constraints and the availability of insurance coverage. If
the risk born by third parties were totally internalized by the firm, the level chosen would
in principle be acceptable to all stakeholders. This rarely happens, of course. Employees,
environmental groups, as well as the surrounding communities might not see or assess
some major technological risk in a similar way. The chosen level of risk, or even the
approach used to reach it, might be a source of conflict. Whether the method was some
cost-benefit analysis or a benchmarking approach using levels of risk tolerated elsewhere,
some stakeholders might point out the limits of science, putting into question the
transparency of the process and the objectivity of the experts involved.
                                                          
10 See the famous experiment results given in Tversky and Kahneman (1981).
11 But if communication fails, correcting for public biases will remain contentious as long as people’s
disagreement is rooted their preferences. For more on this, see Smith (1992).7
For large industrial accidents, employees are more likely than external
stakeholders to convey their interest further because of their tight relationship with the
firm and the bargaining power they have through labor unions. Is this mechanism
sufficient to guarantee that the chosen level of risk will seem acceptable to all the parties
involved? On the one hand, the higher wages employees receive due to their exposure to
risk might raise their tolerance threshold. Furthermore, employees might not know the
exact level of risks they are exposed to. Finally, some selection bias in recruiting and the
effect of training might make to pool of employees constitute a bad representation of the
exposed population.
When a new firm is about to settle nearby, surrounding communities and local
residents often engage in lobbying. In this case, public hearings in the process of
environmental impact assessment certainly provide for more transparency and for the
revelation of preferences. In most cases, however, the plant and its accompanying risks
are already present in the neighborhood. This fait accompli leaves little room for dialogue
and compromise. Communities are thus generally subject to negative externalities. They
have little negotiating power, apart from the threat of legal suits which, as we will see,
also present some difficulties. Furthermore, they are often ill-informed and unable to
reach a proper assessment of the risks.
Setting an acceptable level of risk is thus inevitably a political process, which may
be guided by economic tools [Moatti (1989)]. Economic efficiency and cost effectiveness
prescribe an optimal level where the marginal cost to reduce risk is equal to the marginal
benefit of having a more secure environment. This approach was supported, for instance,
by the International Commission of Radiological Protection and is embedded in popular
criteria such as ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) or ALARP (As Low As
Reasonably Practicable). In a wider multi-criteria approach, however, other factors can be
given more weight and may prevail. Society might want to give priority to employment or
regional development, for example, and the acceptable level of risk will then be that
minimal level compatible with technological or financial objectives. In other
circumstances, Society might instead choose a certain threshold of risk, without being
overly concerned with the economic or opportunity costs that the attainment of such a
level implies. Most practical approaches are of course combinations of the above. In8
addition to some technically and economically feasible lower bound, they usually
prescribe some upper level above which a risk is considered intolerable and must be
reduced. Risks that fall between the two boundaries are deemed acceptable only if all
practical and reasonable measures have been taken; some calculation towards an optimal
solution is thereby asked for. As an illustration, the Canadian Council for Major Industrial
Accident (CCMIA) considers, for instance, that with a probability of damages above 10
-4
a risk is unacceptable, but with a probability below 10 
- 6 it is. Between those two
thresholds, acceptability depends on the use of land and on the feasibility of emergency
measures.
A complement to the above is to decompose the chosen risk level further into
specific safety goals. After satisfying explicit rules and regulations, a firm may set some
threshold for the probability of a severe accident, and then formulate distinct objectives
concerning what is the acceptable probability of casualty for an individual worker (for
instance 10
-3) and for someone from the public (say 10
-5). This procedure is often
followed in Europe, particularly in Holland [Paté-Cornell (1994)].
Finally, the precautionary principle provides another guiding tool to establish the
proper level of risk [Gollier, Julien and Treich (1999)]. In its best known formulation this
principle says that one should not await greater scientific certainty before adopting
protective measures. The precautionary principle thus embodies the fact that when risks
are not well known, preserving flexibility of action – or the possibility of adjusting or
relaxing stringent standards as new information becomes available – has a value that must
be taken into account when assessing the benefits of reducing the risk. The same type of
reasoning holds when damages are totally irreversible. The precautionary principle
currently lies at the foundation of recent European regulations concerning global warming
and genetically-modified cereals.
3.  Risk sharing
Sharing technological risks means to allocate a priori amongst the agents the financial
liability of the potential damages. Who will be responsible for the restoration of the
environment and for the compensation of victims? The firm and its insurers? The victims'9
insurers? Other partners of the firm? The government? The allocation of liability by law
and by contract between the different agents is essential for many reasons. First, sharing
the risk allows for the sustainability of different activities that would otherwise be
abandoned. Most firms could not support alone the burden of liability without running an
excessive risk of going bankrupt. They must therefore share the risk with agents –
insurance companies in most cases – willing to add these risks to their portfolio of
diversified risks. Risk sharing also contributes to make other agents who are benefiting
from the risky activities aware of their responsibilities and accountable for their decisions.
By making the surrounding communities or consumers support some fraction of the
damages (denying them a total compensation), and by making the partners of the firm -
business or financial ones - support some of the risks, one might increase prevention and
mitigation efforts, thereby reducing everyone's exposure. Of course, optimal risk sharing
needs to take into account the respective interests and degree of risk aversion of all
stakeholders, and the means they have to supervise and change the prevailing level of
risks.
3.1 Civil liability
The first risk sharing instrument is the degree of civil liability of the firm and of its
partners.
12 It is given by tort law and by statutory extensions or limitations of this liability.
From these rules, shareholders, lenders, insurers and other business partners make
decisions that will have an impact on the prevailing level of risk. The State has two
objectives in mind when establishing civil liability rules. First it wants to spread risk so
that social cost is internalized, negligence is deterred, and the risk is brought to an
acceptable level. Second, the legislator wants eventual innocent victims to be fairly
compensated whenever possible.
The general civil liability rule imposes on individuals or firms the duty to restore
or compensate for damages caused by their negligence. In principle, such a rule gives
                                                          
12 Pathbreaking work on this topic was accomplished by Calabresi (1970). Here we distinguish civil liability
rules or tort law, whereby victims may claim compensation for the damages suffered, from penal or
statutory liability rules where corporations, directors or officers are exposed to sanctions (fines or
imprisonment, but not compensation) if proven guilty of an offence. For a discussion on penal liability
rules, see chapter 15 of this book.10
incentives to the firm to control its risks tightly and to prevent any damages to third
parties, without the need of legislation on particular control measures. In practice,
however, there are several well-known obstacles to the application of this general rule in
the context of major technological risks.
First, the burden of proof can easily become overwhelming for any plaintiff.
Negligence can be difficult to establish in a context of innovation, for instance, or where
industrial standards of safety are yet to be defined or are too difficult to verify. The
legislator may then decide to enact presumptions of negligence and when certain
conditions are met, the onus of proof will be on the firm to show that it took the
reasonable care expected in the circumstances and adhered to established safety standards.
To this end, conformity to ISO standards like the 14000 series on environmental
management, the upcoming 18000 ones for health and safety in the work place, or the
Responsible Care guidelines for the chemical industry may provide a successful defense.
The legislator can also establish a strict liability rule where the plaintiff only has to prove
a damage as well as the causal link with the firm’s activities, but not negligence on the
firm’s part. In that case, the firm will not defend itself by simply proving reasonable care
and the respect of all recognized standards: only an act of God - the fact that the damage
was totally unforeseeable or the fault of a third party (or of the victim) - would exonerate
a defendant. In the case of strict liability, victims are more likely to be fully compensated
than under a negligence rule. Regimes of strict liability rules were adopted in the United
States notably with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA). The Council of Europe has also adopted such a regime in 1993
in the Convention on Civil Liability for Damages Resulting from Activities Dangerous to
the Environment (ETS No. 150). This type of regime may lead, however, to excessive
prevention, or push certain firms to simply exit the industry. If the firm bears all the risk
of an accident and cannot show that it was caused by a random factor, it will become
much more conservative, and the accrued precaution is likely to be reflected in price
increases and a loss in competition if firms leave [Shavell (1979), Manning (1994)].
Finally, the proof of damage itself may not always be easily made. This is especially true
for latent diseases. Showing a causal link between an activity and some occurring damage
may be difficult when the damage could be attributed to a combination of many factors11
such as the climate or the victims’ health. The success of the plaintiff and the
effectiveness of the liability rule will depend on the conclusiveness of the proof that is
required from the plaintiff. Chapter 15 provides a more in depth analysis of the efficiency
of different liability rules for promoting safety behavior and victim compensation.
Transaction costs can also jeopardize both the incentive mechanism and the
compensation objectives. Litigation costs – including time and expertise costs – preclude
the victims from being totally compensated and discourage some proper use of the
system. The dispersion of damages among a large group of victims can present some
further difficulties when each person is affected in a small fashion and nobody alone has
enough incentive to bring the case to court. Class action suits may then alleviate this
problem.
Whether the goals of safety and full compensation can always be met by a single
liability rule is therefore unlikely.
13 But perhaps the most critical aspect of liability rules
in the case of major technological risks is the fact that the liability of a corporation is
limited to its assets. When damages are much larger than the assets of the company,
incentives for risk reduction are more limited: to the eyes of the firm a large-scale
catastrophe is the same thing as one that just makes it go bankrupt. The level of
prevention will therefore not differ past a certain point. Some existing solutions to this
problem are presented in the next subsections.
3.2  Extended liability to the firm’s partners
The firm who holds the risk-inducing technology rarely constitutes the only node
in the production chain. Financial institutions provide funds to support the firm's
activities, and other commercial partners either consume the firm's hazardous products or
participate in the production process as input providers.
                                                          
13 For the necessity of a combination of instruments depending on the characteristics of the risks, see
Katzman (1987) and Segerson (1992). To illustrate further, consider torts where several several injurers
may have contributed to a single damage. A joint and several liability regime will foster the compensation
goal by permitting the plaintiff to sue all or any of the injurers. But the cost of poor practice is then spread
amongst many firms who then have lower incentives, individually, to take good care.12
A firm may be tempted to outsource risky activities and make subcontractors bare
the responsibilities associated to them. In this case, potential subcontractors will naturally
demand a risk premium and the size of that premium will determine in part whether the
activity will be subcontracted or not [as exemplified, for instance, in a recent study by
Aubert, Patry and Rivard (1998)]. For activities occurring in a highly competitive market,
like transportation, outsourcing is all the more appealing since the premium that can be
extracted is limited by the market structure. But transferring risky activities to competitive
subcontractors may result in lesser effort devoted to safety. Subcontractors cannot
generally manage these types of risks nor insure themselves as easily as larger firms.
Furthermore, smaller contractors may be more reckless since they have much less to lose.
This may lead them to take less precautions and to underinvest in their processes in order
to shelter their assets from major technological risks, for in the event of an accident, they
may always benefit from the protection of bankruptcy laws.
One way out of this is to make several nodes in the production chain
(subcontrators and subcontractees, lenders and debtors) jointly and severally liable in case
of a major industrial accident. One hopes thereby to facilitate victims’ compensation by
going into the "deeper pockets", insuring that the latter do not let others with "shallow
pockets" run unreasonable risks. The presumption is also that the involved external parties
will put pressure on the firm to make sufficient investments in safety. The courts will
trace the participation of firms linked to the risky activities either by the fact that they
possess critical information concerning safety, or by the fact that they are the owner,
operator or manufacturer of the processes or products at stake.
The economic downside of an extended liability regime, however, is that the
targeted firm might change its pattern of transactions or expose less capital to liability
when it cannot invest in safety nor control the risk. [Boyd and Ingberman (1997)] For
instance, toxic waste producers may be held liable for damages due to a leak in the
landfill operated by another firm in which their waste is disposed of. By wanting to limit
the wealth they are exposing to liability, targeted waste producers, especially smaller
ones, may exhibit distorted capital investment and output choices. Furthermore, this
regime might encourage contractual relations or affiliation between firms with similar
degrees of solvency or safety standards: deep-pocketed firms will avoid contracts or13
affiliations with shallow-pocketed firms, even when it is not socially optimal, and small
firms will get together without putting due care on the risk they generate.
14 So while
extended liability may improve social cost internalization and deterrence, it may not
necessarily improve welfare and a tradeoff must be made.
Legislation like CERCLA in the United States and other regulations on the
allocation of clean up costs for contaminated sites are used to extend liability to lenders.
The decision power of secured creditors in the firm management or the fact that they
become owner of certain assets when the firm is in default can lead to their liability. Here
again, extended liability may have downsides. It may affect the availability of credit, the
cost of capital and the level of investment. Research results show among other things the
importance of the information structure and of asymmetric information phenomena such
as moral hazard - not observing the firm’s efforts on prevention and mitigation – and
adverse selection - not knowing the firm's initial risk profile - on the optimal extended
liability rule. They suggest that lender's liability be only partial.
15
3.3  Insurance
Firms facing major technological risks will seek to insure themselves whenever
such insurance exists at a reasonable cost. Demand for insurance against liability claims
by industrial firms results in part from risk aversion on the part of concerned firms and
their shareholders or lenders; it may also be required by the law. The Convention on Civil
Liability adopted by the Council of Europe requires that firms have a financial security
scheme to cover liability. This scheme may take the form of an insurance contract or other
financial arrangements among an industrial pool for example.
16 In the United States, the
same is required from facilities that produce or handle hazardous chemicals by the
                                                          
14 Affiliation between firms is recognized when several contractors or clients do business with a common
producer.
15 For a survey on lender’s liability, see Boyer and Laffont (1996). Gobert and Poitevin (1997) and Pitchford
(1995) also present different approaches to derive the lender’s optimal liability rule. For a discussion of
lender’s liability within the general corporate landscape, see Boyer and Sinclair-Desgagné (1999). For
empirical evidence of the effect of such legislation on the cost of capital, see Garber and Hammitt (1998).
16 See section 12 of the Convention on Civil Liability for damages resulting from activities dangerous to the
environment (ETS No. 150).14
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Compulsory liability insurance enhances the
compensation of victims who would otherwise face a bankrupt firm.
Other benefits can be derived from insurance with respect to major technological
risks. By design, the terms of an insurance policy, namely the premium, the extent of
coverage, restrictions, exclusions and deductibles, should separate and deal with the
various sizes and types of risks involved. Insurance contracts then become a mechanism
that provides incentives to reduce risks. The insurer thereby takes the role of a surrogate
regulator. The case of industrial boilers is a good illustration of the role insurers can play
in risk reduction [see Paté-Cornell (1996), Er et al. (1998)].
For most major technological risks, however, insurance is not readily available, so
insurers cannot fulfill a role in risk sharing and reduction. Technological risks that are too
uncertain for a firm to bear may also be too uncertain for an insurance company that
typically shows ambiguity aversion [Kunreuther et al. (1995)]. Lack of actuarial data and
their public good nature, dramatic consequences that can amount to enormous costs, the
uncertain duration of adverse effects or of the latency period, and the fact that liability
rules can change over time can deter insurers from entering the market. Moreover, the
increasing complexity of technology, which makes the causal relationship between safety
measures and risk reduction difficult to grasp, tends to exacerbate both the classical
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.
Under adverse selection, when insurance companies cannot assess precisely the
respective risk of their potential clients before agreeing on the terms of a policy, insurance
becomes less efficient as a means to redistribute risk [Borch (1990)]. An average rate
coupled with cross subsidies between low and high risks is no longer sustainable because
it is not attractive to low-risk agents. Different policy packages are then offered – high
premium/large coverage and low premium/partial coverage – so agents will implicitly
reveal their risk profile by the choice they make. The most likely outcome is then under-
insurance of firms who generate lower risks, since only those firms will choose a partial
insurance contract. Hence when adverse selection is too severe, as may be the case for
major risks, there can actually be no insurance available: no package will be profitable at
current insurance premiums, and raising premiums would only attract the worst risks,
reducing profits further.15
Moral hazard, or the possibility that the firm, once insured, takes less prevention
measures, will also reduce the available coverage [Shavell (1979)]. Unless the level of
safety and prevention is perfectly observable by the insurance company, the insured agent
has less incentive to be prudent, once insured, and is therefore more likely to cause harm.
In this case the only way to provide some incentive for prevention and damage mitigation
is to offer an incomplete coverage (or a large deductible), thereby making the insured firm
bear some of the risk. There is thus a tradeoff between optimal risk sharing and incentives
to prevention and mitigation. Experience rating - when subsequent premiums depend on
the track record of the firms – is sometimes invoked to alleviate this tradeoff. It is not,
however, a system that insurance companies can rely on for major technological risks,
since data in this case is so rare. An alternative route is ex post supervision with coverage
and premium depending upon the observed prevention and mitigation levels. Such
inquiries, however, are often very costly.
 Finally, insurance availability is also limited in some areas due to the correlation
of risks. If the risks of the whole pool of insured agents are not statistically independent,
the probability increases for an insurance company that it may have to pay out
indemnities all at once; some insurers might then find this too large a risk to bear. This
may be the case for widespread substances that prove to be hazardous at the same point in
time (like asbestos), triggering massive toxic torts. The year 2000 computer bug is
another example of the kind of risk uninsurable for high correlation reasons. Another
source of correlation can come from changes in liability rules that make all insured agents
liable at once.
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Insurability of major technological risks is thus problematic. However, it holds an
important key to proper internalization of those risks: insurance contracts can provide
incentives for risk reduction by aligning their terms with good risk control measures. One
important improvement in the management of major technological risks would therefore
be better techniques to monitor and appraise initiatives in risk control. For this, one needs
some means of references for recognizing the application of reliable measures. Er et al.
(1998) propose third-party inspection to improve risk estimate and thereby enhance the
role insurance can play in risk reduction and risk sharing. Risk retention groups - where16
insurance funds are held by industrial pools of similar policyholders - may also provide a
solution. These groups are in a better position to monitor managerial performance than an
external insurance company and may do it at lower costs.
18
4.  Risk control
Risk control measures include self-protection, i.e. activities affecting the probability
of a loss, and self-insurance, i.e. activities aimed at lowering the loss itself when it
occurs.
19 The firm’s or the risk maker’s problem is to choose an optimal combination of
the two approaches to risk control. Boyer and Dionne (1983) have shown that a risk-
averse agent would prefer self-insurance to self-protection even when they both reduce
the expected loss to the same extent and at the same cost. Intuitively, self-insurance is
more efficient because it increases the wealth in the bad state where the marginal utility of
income is higher. However, in the context of major technological risks, the irreversibility
of losses often makes both types of activities indispensable and equally important, if not
mandatory. This section reviews the literature on both subjects, starting with the former.
To be consistent with current literature, self-protection is called prevention, while self-
insurance refers to mitigation efforts.
4.1 Prevention
Preventive measures involve both public and private means of intervention. Some
of the possible strategies will now be discussed.
4.1.1 Public measures
State intervention in the field of safety with respect to major technological risks is
rather extensive.
20 It is justified on the grounds of classical market imperfections such as
imperfect information and, of course, negative externalities. Control of activities
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 For an analysis of liability insurance and catastrophic environmental risk, see Katzman (1987).
18 For other solutions to insurability problems, see Contributions to Insurance Economics (1992) Ed.
Dionne, G. Boston : Kluwer Academic Press.
19 See Ehrlich and Becker (1972).
20 For a good overview of the role the government can play in the management of environmental risks and
an analysis of the efficiency of different policy instruments, see Segerson (1992).17
generating risks through command and control regulation, legal liability rules or
economic incentive instruments such as Pigouvian taxes, tradable permits or refundable
deposits all offer advantages and drawbacks. While economic instruments provide more
room for efficiency and the implementation of cost effective measures, they are not easily
applicable to actions that are (1) discrete and (2) difficult to monitor as is often the case
for actions leading to major accidents. Legal liability rules, like economic instruments,
also provide incentive to reduce risk as well as securing some compensation for victims
should the damage occur. Furthermore, they do not require that the firm’s behavior be
monitored. Liability rules have nonetheless their limitations as we saw. They are thus
invariably complemented with safety regulation. Defining safety standards and
obligations, together with fines and other sanctions for noncompliance, remains in fact the
most common approach to regulating hazardous processes and products. The following is
a list of existing command-and-control legislations designed to reduce risks.
Table 1 Command-and-control legislation to reduce risk
Occupational safety and health legislation
Public health legislation ( food and drugs, etc)
Environmental legislation, itself very vast : air, water, ground
quality, impact assessment, etc.






Consumer product safety legislation
Ports and waterway safety legislation
Nuclear installations legislation
Other energy specific legislation18
The difficulty with command-and-control intervention on the other hand is that the
legislator must be omniscient. She must know everything about technology and about the
performance of different risk reduction measures. This knowledge acquisition may turn
out to be very costly. Furthermore, the government must carry inspections to insure that
legislation is enforced. The actions likely to lead to accidents must therefore be
observable at a reasonable cost in order to be efficiently regulated.
21 Command and
control regulation is nevertheless often preferred, for it addresses problems more directly
than economic incentives generally do.
Banning some products or processes is another, albeit radical, avenue that is often
taken. The fact that society in this case loses some benefits it would otherwise reap from
technology can be justified by invoking the precautionary principle, or because the
irreversible nature of the damages (say the potential losses of hundreds of lives) forbids
any cost-benefit tradeoff, or finally because it is not in the firm’s interest to find out at its
own costs the true risks involved [Shavell (1993)].
State intervention to prevent damage can also take the form of subsidy for the
development of safer technology. It can actually be more efficient to have particular
agreements between the government and the firm in order to meet the goals of regulation.
This is the case, for instance, when enhanced safety requires the development of new
technology or when research results have a public good nature. In this case, the
government wants to both control behavior and stimulate innovation, two goals that can
be more easily achieved by a kind of contract that sets certain standards on the one hand
and that subsidizes part of the innovation on the other
 [Carraro and Siniscalco (1996)].
Many official reports and inquiry have brought up the need for “goal setting” type
of regulation instead of the standard-setting type.
22 With goal-setting regulation, operators
must demonstrate safe design and operation to the regulator rather than mere compliance
with pre-specified technologies and checklists. In keeping with this, both the United
States and the European Union have adopted major hazard legislation to control these
risks. In Europe, in the aftermath of the Seveso disaster in Italy where an accidental
                                                          
21 See Shavell (1984) for the characteristics risks must show in order for the regulatory approach to be
appropriate.
22 The Report after Three Mile Island and the Piper Alpha Report both insisted on this aspect.19
release of dioxin shook the whole continent, the European Council adopted the 1982
Seveso Directive, which was reinforced in 1988 and 1996. It essentially requires that
there be an obligation for firms to adopt safety measures and emergency plans, and that
this information be made available to the public. Similarly, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency has recently strengthened the control of risks by developing
performance-based (or goal setting) regulations also aimed at preventing and mitigating
major chemical accidental releases. These new rules are commonly referred to as the Risk
Management Planning requirements or RMP.
23 RMP imposes on firms producing or
handling certain chemical substances the obligation to conduct an offsite consequence
analysis assessing the worst-case scenario and to develop and implement risk
management programs including emergency plans. All this information must be
submitted thereafter to a central location and be made available to the local authorities
and the public. One goal here is to appeal to market mechanisms to induce risk reduction,
in particular to capital markets believed to be sensitive to this kind of information
[Kleidorfer and Orts (1998 ) and Lanoie et al. (1998)].
4.1.2  Private measures
Once a firm meets safety standards imposed by law and regulation, it may still
seek to decrease its residual risk. Actions firms can take to control the source of risks and
reduce the probability of damages include the adoption of inherently safer technology and
of technical safety features (additional safety valves, detection devices, etc.), and the
reduction of hazardous material inventories. Increased emphasis has also recently been
put on management systems, such as specific training to promote workers’ reflexes and
awareness concerning safety, task division and clear definition of responsibilities,
information and control systems keeping track of interventions, and audit schemes to
detect lacunae and suggest remedies.
24
                                                          
23 EPA rules on Chemical Accident Prevention and Risk Management Planning were adopted in 1996,
pursuing the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990, section 112 ( r ). Firms have until June 1999 to submit
their plan.
24 See also Chapter 10 for a discussion of these issues within the framework of operations strategy.20
Table 2 gives an overview of the typical elements of process safety management.
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Table 2 – Elements of process safety management
Review and documentation of the plant’s chemicals, processes, and equipment;
Detailed process hazard analysis to identify hazards, assess the likelihood of
accidental releases, and evaluate the consequences of such releases;
Development of standard operating procedures;
Training of employees on procedures;
Implementation of a preventive maintenance program;
Management of changes in operation that may have an impact on the safety of
the system;
Reviews before initial start-up of a process and before start-up following a
modification of a process;
Investigation and documentation of accidents;
Periodic safety audits to ensure that procedures and practices are being followed.
When these elements are implemented and emergency plans (discussed later) are
put in place, however, several questions remain to be answered. What is the best strategy,
reducing the risk further or insuring it as it is? What is the optimal level of investment in
safety? Is the so-called "human error" entirely controlled? In the next subsection we relate
these to the observations of several studies and expand on the importance of
organizational means.
The safety versus productive investment
All members of the firm face this apparent trade-off, from the bottom hierarchical
levels to intermediate managers up to the board of directors. High-ranked executives must
decide on the financial resources that will be devoted respectively to safety and market
                                                          
25 These elements are part of the OSHA Process Safety Management Standard. The Center for Chemical
Process Safety, established as a Directorate of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers following the
Bophal disaster, proposes similar elements in its safety process management guide.21
research, whereas the foreman must decide whether or not he should spend an extra day
double-checking safety procedures instead of spending time on more productive (and
often more visible) activities.
The safety budget decision – upgrading older equipment, hiring extra people,
improving maintenance, etc. – should in principle be related to the marginal productivity
of such investment and the marginal productivity of other inputs. How does further
investment in safety translates into reduced liability, lower insurance premium, better
access to capital, stronger partnerships, etc.? Measuring this however, poses problems, for
it is difficult to establish the effects of some prevention measures (especially
organizational ones) on low probability levels. When dealing with recurrent workplace
accidents with relatively smaller consequences (albeit very significant, when workers die
or when a whole plant is shut down for several days), the marginal productivity of safety
investments might be easier to measure. This is, however, not the case for low probability
events with very large consequences. It is therefore not surprising that safety budgets are
often dictated by safety regulation, industrial standards or insurance companies. Empirical
studies actually notice an overemphasis on insurance as opposed to actual risk factors and
the lack of communication and coordination between the financial division of the firm,
that usually deals with insurance matters, and the production staff, who generally take
care of safety [see Paté-Cornell (1996)]. Furthermore, it has been observed that firms tend
to focus on short term production goals as opposed to long term safety issues. This is
especially true for companies experiencing financial difficulties. It was the case for the
Union Carbide plant at Bhopal, although other factors also contributed to the disaster
[Lees (1996)].
Human error
Be it in design, in construction, or during operation and maintenance, human error
is often seen as the culprit after a major industrial accident occurs. And for good reasons:
in a study of marine systems such as offshore platforms, for instance, it was found that
only 5 % of the failure probability could be truly attributed to random factors or "bad
luck," 40% to design errors and the rest to operation errors [Paté-Cornell (1990)]. Human22
errors can be classified under the following headings: slips and lapses, mistakes,
misperceptions, mistaken priorities and straightforward violations. Causes of human
errors can be some external events or distractions, the operator’s inability or poor training,
excessive demands and pressure being put on personnel, and biased incentives. Several
observers have noticed that the allocation of resources between technical and
organizational or managerial measures are not well balanced, and that if more attention
were devoted to management, then the occurrence of human errors might diminish [Paté-
Cornell (1996); Warner et al. (1992)]. But firms typically prefer to add physical
redundancy or to use stronger materials rather than rely on better training, hire more
competent managers and operators, or have external reviews (audits) of technological
design. The report following the Three Mile Island incident actually pointed out this bias
in the allocation of resources.
Organizational measures
Poor involvement of high executives in risk management is often mentioned as a
factor contributing to higher levels of risk. It was one of the main criticism in a report
leading to the shut down of seven nuclear reactors in Canada in 1997. It is also one of the
lessons learned from the Seveso accident where the directors of the corporation ultimately
responsible were unfamiliar with the hazards. More involvement of high ranked officials
in routine risk management should allow for a stronger control of intermediate
management decisions. On the other hand, by limiting the decision power on issues that
intermediate managers often master best, the firm might lose some opportunities that do
not necessarily compromise safety. Furthermore, better monitoring by higher hierarchical
level will be futile if the actions of employees or lower ranked managers are not readily
observable or if one would need to be close to them at all time to detect problems and to
prevent them.
Other mistaken organisational arrangements can contribute to increase risk levels.
For example, when the distribution of tasks is such that the responsibility for risk
management is separated for highly dependent subsystems, the lack of coordination can
have unforeseen repercussions. The explosion of the Challenger space shuttle and the23
Eurotunnel 1995 fire are illustrations of this point. Task design, distribution and
remuneration can lead to consistent biases away from safety activities. Different
arrangements are then needed to realign employees’ incentives with the firm’s safety
goals. It might be worthwhile, for instance, to delegate different maintenance activities to
different divisions when those activities cannot be monitored equally well. Otherwise, a
division in charge of both tasks would be tempted to allocate more effort to the more
easily monitored ones, in order to signal diligent work, and neglect the other one
[Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)]. When the tasks cannot be easily separated, a special
audit and remuneration scheme may not only promote an efficient allocation of effort in
both safety and production but also induce synergies between otherwise substitutable
tasks [Sinclair-Desgagné (1999)]. It might also be safer to avoid letting a single division
decide on the adoption of a new technology when the choice involves technologies
characterized by different risk levels and different maintenance requirements. If the
division is in charge of maintenance, safety could be neglected and the ultimate decision
would not be in the best interest of the firm [Hirao (1993); Itoh (1994); Vafai (1998)].
Information disclosure
Efficiency and learning about loss control measures require that information
concerning near-misses, alerts and other deficiencies be disclosed instead of remaining in
a private circle. Information demonstrating reliability of the engineering system and of the
risk management system should also be disclosed, as it promotes the reputation of the
firm and may enhance its value. However, the implementation of any system aimed at
revealing key information is likely to face fierce resistance. The fear of reprisal naturally
leads employees to dissimulate their own problems, mistakes and errors. But loss control
measures cannot improve without their collaboration on this. Hence, several experts favor
a forgiving approach rather than a carrot-and-stick one with respect to individual
performance in risk management; they believe this would encourage information
revelation [Warner et al. (1992)]. It is certainly necessary to take into account all market
features that can have a direct impact on the firm's value and the executive's career24
prospects in order to find ways by which executives would voluntarily submit the firm to
safety audits or any system that discloses information.
4.2 Mitigation
Containing the scale of adverse events through ex ante and ex post mitigation
measures is the other route that leads to risk reduction. It can be a very effective strategy,
especially when there is a lot of uncertainty about the probabilities of failures or about
some particular effects. The extent of damages in a given industrial accident is a function
of two essential elements: (1) the quantity of people and the value of resources exposed to
the risk, and (2) the effectiveness of emergency intervention. These are under the partial
control of public authorities and the firm through complementary means that are
presented below.
Siting and urban planning
Zoning regulation is certainly one of the oldest and most obvious form of risk
reduction. By splitting the territory and isolating hazardous plants, public exposure to risk
is diminished. Environmental assessment procedures may also require proper risk analysis
that defines a transition zone, helping thereby to determine a location minimizing the
potential damages. The solution is not always easy to implement, however. First, firms
may be reluctant to locate at a distance that raises their transportation costs or affects the
availability of inputs. Linking risk performance and zoning is used more and more
frequently to circumvent this problem; it allows more flexibility in land use as long as the
firm controls the risk with other measures. This of course defeats the purpose of using
mitigation measures to further reduce the risk. This alternative is also more costly in
terms of monitoring and emergency planning and may shift the cost from the firm and its
particular clients to the local community. Secondly, zoning regulation typically
categorizes industries into different types – light, heavy or general – and locates them
accordingly. These categories based on historical data can rapidly become outdated due to
innovations in products and processes.25
More critically, relatively few local communities take or have taken into account
major technological risks in their zoning decisions. Their analyses are usually confined to
common nuisance like noise and odors. Another difficulty comes from the strong lobby of
developers who do not see a problem in impeding on transition zones that should
normally be prohibited for residential purposes. This was actually one of the main
problems at Seveso; it was also particularly acute in Mexico City when the petrochemical
terminal of PEMEX exploded, as well as in Bhopal where shanty towns extended up to
the plant’s boundary. Local authorities in financial difficulties are less likely to resist this
pressure. Finally, grouping several hazardous plants within one area may entail another
tradeoff: the population might be less exposed to each risk taken separately, but the
likelihood of a domino effect and much larger damages can rise with the geographic
concentration of risks.
In 1992, the OECD set some guiding principles for zoning decisions: there should
be general zoning criteria as well as a case by case assessment for any new industries and
for any new development near hazardous installations. It is, however, recognized that risk
assessment is still largely absent from land use planning and zoning regulation, a problem
that the latest amendments to the Seveso Directive have sought to address. One reason
explaining this problem is the lack of clear and accepted guidelines on both the
methodology for risk assessment and on the definition of an acceptable level of risk
[Canadian Council for Major Industrial Accidents (1995)].
Emergency planning
The other approach to damage mitigation consists in preparing in advance the
interventions of the different parties in case of a disaster in order to prevent further
escalation of the original incident. In a study done by the Reactor Safety Study of the
Atomic Energy Commission, it was estimated that for a particular scenario early fatalities
would be reduced from 6200 to 350 if there was effective evacuation [Atomic Energy
Commission (1975)]. However, although emergency planning is usually required by
regulations on hazardous substances and processes, technical and organizational26
uncertainty in the firm and the lack of proper contingency plans are factors that often
prevent damages from being properly contained.
The essential elements of an emergency plan are the control systems, personnel
with specified responsibilities, communication scenarios, clear rules and procedures, and
coordination/cooperation between various external and internal services. Communication
is of particular importance in the very first stages of a crisis since it is at that time that key
interventions are made. Nevertheless, delays in reaction and in communication are often
observed. Typically, each level waits until the situation is locally out of control before
alerting other divisions all the way to public authorities and the population. The level of
preparedness and coordination of each party involved – the firm, the public security
teams, and the population – is thus crucial and will determine to a large extent the scale of
damages.
Of course, it is not sufficient that emergency plans be thoroughly designed.
Actually, the main lesson from the past is that these plans should be kept simple and
flexible, and be capable of being scaled up or down according to circumstances [Lees
(1996), volume 2]. They must also be put to trial and reassessed regularly. This requires
time and resources since the operations will often be interrupted. It also requires that the
firm accepts some transparency vis-à-vis its workers and the surrounding communities.
Unless a culture of safety is well embedded in the organization and there is prior
coordination with public security and with the community, damages are bound to be
large. This culture largely bears on a voluntary basis, but legislation like the new RMP
rules in the US reinforcing the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
and the Seveso Directive in Europe certainly contribute to tighter relationship and
coherence between stakeholders. Both of these regimes require that firms dealing with
hazardous substances develop emergency response programs including procedures for
informing the public and coordinating with the local agencies responsible for emergency
intervention.27
5.  Conclusion
Regulations and management principles toward major technological risks are now
evolving rapidly, following the pace of innovation. This chapter summarized the main
traditional facets of dealing with major technological risks: assessment, insurance,
prevention and mitigation. It is probable that each of those aspects will change
significantly over the next decades. Changes will be triggered by the outcomes of the
millenium bug and the consequent realization by the public of the current overreliance on
larger and larger computer networks, and also by the proliferation of new drugs, products
and livestock born from genetic manipulations. We believe, however, that the categories
and tradeoffs emphasized above [following Warner (1992)] - quantitative vs. qualitative
assessments, preventive vs. mitigating expenses, no-fault vs. carrot-and-stick approaches,
narrow vs. broad stakeholders involvement – are inescapable and will therefore prevail. It
is the answers to those tradeoffs that will adjust, according to the evolution of society and
of technology.28
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